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ABSTRACT 
The body of research that focuses on employees’ Information 
Security Policy compliance is problematic as it treats compliance 
as a single behavior. This study explored the underlying 
behavioral context of information security in the workplace, 
exploring how individual and organizational factors influence the 
interplay of the motivations and barriers of security behaviors. 
Investigating factors that had previously been explored in security 
research, 20 employees from two organizations were interviewed 
and the data was analyzed using framework analysis. The analysis 
indicated that there were seven themes pertinent to information 
security: Response Evaluation, Threat Evaluation, Knowledge, 
Experience, Security Responsibility, Personal and Work 
Boundaries, and Security Behavior. The findings suggest that 
these differ by security behavior and by the nature of the behavior 
(e.g. on- and offline). Conclusions are discussed highlighting 
barriers to security actions and implications for future research 
and workplace practice. 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
1.2 Employees and Information Security 
Recently, attention has been drawn to the accidental disclosure of 
sensitive information and the role employees play in both its 
protection and leakage. In the UK, the governance of sensitive 
data belonging to living individuals is under the jurisdiction of the 
Data Protection Act (DPA; 1998) and governed by the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). The ICO can sanction 
organizations up to £500, 000 for breaching the DPA as the 
leakage of sensitive data can cause harm and distress to 
individuals, including reputational and financial damages. The 
information stored by organizations is not restricted to living 
individuals as organizations also store information sensitive to 
their business operation, e.g. their intellectual property. Leakages 
of this sensitive information can negatively affect businesses’ 
operation and reputation.  
Despite the many negative consequences resulting from 
information disclosure, the prevalence of security breaches is 
high. For example, the PWC 2014 Information Security Breaches 
Survey found that 81% of large organizations and 60% of small 
businesses experienced a security breach in the previous year [1]. 
This survey indicates that breach rate is high but the severity of 
these breaches is wide-ranging. More severe cases can have 
repercussions to organizations; for example, in 2011 the Sony 
PlayStation Network was hacked leaking the personal information 
of its gamers. Alongside service disruption and damage to Sony’s 
reputation, they were also fined £250, 000 by the ICO [28] for 
breaching the DPA (1998). 
Employees are a mixed blessing when it comes to information 
security.  They act as both a major cause of breaches and as the 
last line of defense. Research indicates that 46% of data breaches 
in the UK are due to insider negligence [32] and erroneous 
behavior when handling information [54]. To protect their 
organization’s systems and data, employees must follow a number 
of security procedures to counteract security threats. These may 
include using strong passwords, encryption, anti-malware 
software and installing software updates. The specific 
responsibilities will differ by organization and be dictated within 
the Information Security Policy (ISP). These policies detail 
security actions employees are expected to take, some of which 
may be easier to follow than others.  
Security procedures such as antivirus updates are now being 
automated to reduce the burden on employees [24]. However, 
other procedures such as password design are the direct 
responsibility of the employee. The degree to which an employee 
behaves securely may differ depending upon the level of effort 
required.  Required effort is one of the many factors that influence 
employees’ behavior.  
A number of theories of behavior have identified different factors 
that influence behavior. In this paper we will review these factors 
and identify whether or not there is support for them in the 
security literature. We then present the findings of a qualitative 
study investigating these factors in two different research 
institutions.  
1.3 Security Research Paradigms 
Previous research into ISP compliance has been largely 
underpinned using models from behavior change literature to 
identify influencers of security behavior. These include Protection 
Motivation Theory, the Theory of Planned Behavior and the 
Health Belief Model.  Studies exploring the validity of such 
models, which do focus on single behaviors tend to focus on 
private use of technology rather than workplace use [e.g. 22, 40]. 
The use of this “compliance paradigm” is criticized for its 
operationalization of security behavior as a single behavior 
referred to as ‘compliance’ [9]. ISPs dictate many different 
security behaviors (See appendix A for summary of ISP topics 
Copyright is held by the author/owner. Permission to make digital or 
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identified).  Furthermore, there is little consensus on the content 
of security policies between organizations. This approach assumes 
employees’ awareness of the content of these policies and finally 
when questioned about ISP compliance, different people may 
adopt different frames of reference depending on what is most 
salient to them at the time. These issues raise concerns about the 
validity of quantitative, survey research on policy compliance 
conducted across multiple organizations. Such research is often 
interested in exploring what motivates compliance behavior, but 
what influences compliance for one behavior might not influence 
it with another. For example, self-efficacy might be important to 
motivate compliance with password behaviors but not important 
for downloading software updates.  
By reducing compliance to a single behavior it therefore limits our 
understanding of what influences individual security behaviors.  
Behavior change research acknowledges that motivation of 
behavior differs by behavior and context [20]. It is important 
within a work context to explore specific security behaviors rather 
than focusing solely on compliance with ISPs.  
1.4 What influences secure behavior? 
Models from behavior change are useful to understand the 
processes that underpin security behaviors. These can aid the 
design of interventions to promote secure behavior based upon the 
strength of the relationships between the theoretical constructs 
and the security behavior of interest. The two most frequently 
used theories are the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) [e.g. 12, 
30], which identifies a link between attitudes and behavior, and 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) [e.g. 25, 33] which is a risk-
perception theory exploring an individual’s threat and response 
appraisal and their motivation to protect themselves.  
The use of theoretical models facilitates the identification of 
factors that lead to employees’ compliance with their 
organization’s ISP or why consumers engage in a specific security 
behavior. In this section, the factors that have been consistently 
explored in research on security in the workplace and in home-
users are discussed. 
Self-efficacy  is an individual’s beliefs about their competence to 
cope with a task and exercise influence over the events that affect 
their lives [5].  In a security context, employees who have high 
self-efficacy are more likely to follow security procedures, as they 
are more effective in learning how to follow them and believe 
they are able to perform the required behavior. Self-efficacy is 
within many behavior change theories including PMT and social 
learning theory. Self-efficacy is consistently shown to influence 
security policy compliance [12, 25, 29, 30, 40, 55]. Furthermore, 
support has been found for a relationship between self-efficacy 
and virus protection behaviours [36], using a personal firewall 
[39],  being cautious with emails that have attachments [40], and 
anti-spyware adoption [22, 37, 51] for consumers.  
Social influence is the extent to which an individual’s behavior is 
influenced by what relevant others (e.g. colleagues) expect 
him/her to do and the extent to which they believe others are 
performing the behavior. In a security context, employees are 
more likely to behave securely if those around them behave 
securely and expect such behavior of others. Employees’ work 
environment and the individuals within this environment are 
therefore important drivers of security actions. The role of social 
influence is consistently shown to relate to compliance intention 
[12, 24, 25, 29, 30].  
Attitude is the individual’s positive or negative feelings toward 
engaging in a specified behavior, in other words towards 
behaving securely or complying with the ISP. The TPB argues 
that attitude is a predictor of behavior, alongside subjective norms 
and perceived behavioral control (a form of self-efficacy) [3]. The 
notion is that a positive attitude toward behaving securely 
influences intentions to behave securely. The influence of attitude 
on compliance intention has  been consistently supported [12, 25, 
29, 41]. Support has been found for a relationship between 
attitude and anti-spyware adoption [16], online privacy protective 
strategies [13, 59] and firewall adoption [35]. This suggests that 
attitude may be an important antecedent of security behavior.  
Research has also explored individuals’ threat and response 
evaluations in the context of security which stems largely from 
PMT [45]. The theory argues that individuals are motivated to 
protect themselves based upon their threat and coping appraisal. 
An individual’s threat appraisal assesses the perceived 
susceptibility to the threat and the severity of the consequences. 
The coping appraisal is their evaluation of the response to the 
situation and consists of response efficacy and self-efficacy.  
Perceived susceptibility is an individual’s assessment of the 
probability of events happening to them. Individuals that have a 
sense that security attacks are unlikely, may not engage in security 
practices. On the other hand feeling susceptible to security attacks 
may result in protective behavior. The role of perceived 
susceptibility on compliance intention [30, 49] and use of anti-
virus software by consumers [36] is supported. The relationship 
between perceived susceptibility and anti-spyware usage is not 
always supported [14, 22]. Recent research found perceived 
susceptibility did not play a role in employees’ security breach 
concerns [25].  
Perceived severity is the assessment of the seriousness of a 
security threat and its associated consequences. If an employee 
perceives a threat to the information resources of their 
organization to be severe, they are more likely to engage in 
security actions and adopt secure behaviors [12]. The relationship 
between perceived severity and secure behavior is not always 
supported.  Support was found for the relationship to information 
security compliance [25, 49, 55]. However, other research found 
that perceived severity was not supported, attributing this to 
differences in the conceptualization of severity in previous studies 
[30]. The support for a relationship between severity and anti-
spyware adoption [14, 22] has been found but its role in being 
cautious with emails that have attachments [40] and anti-virus 
protection has remained unsupported [36]. This further highlights 
that factors do not play the same role in all security behaviors.  
Whilst some research [41] supported the role of susceptibility and 
severity on compliance intention, they combine these constructs 
so it is difficult to disentangle the effects.  
Response efficacy is the belief in the benefits of the behavior [45] 
i.e. that a specific security behavior will reduce security breaches. 
On the other hand, if an individual has less belief in the efficacy 
of the behavior, they are less likely to adopt it.  Response efficacy, 
which is part of PMT, has received less attention in research 
compared to other factors. The research that exists supports the 
relationship between response efficacy and ISP compliance [30], 
attitude toward security policies [25] and intention to adopt anti-
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spyware software [14, 22, 33]. Recent studies found a negative 
relationship with ISP compliance [55] or no relationship [49].  
Response costs refer to beliefs about how costly performing the 
recommended security behavior will be. These costs include 
money, time, and the effort expended. If an individual perceives 
that a considerable cost is associated with a behavior, they will be 
unlikely to follow through with it. Conversely, if a small cost is 
incurred, the behavior may be adopted. The compliance budget 
[8] supports the role of response costs, they found that individuals 
and organizations place different values on the cost and benefits 
of different behaviors within ISPs. They argue that an employee’s 
compliance or non-compliance is determined by the perceived 
costs and benefits of it. Mixed findings are reported in the 
literature; a negative relationship with ISP compliance has been 
found [25, 55] whereas other research has found no relationship 
[30]. Mixed findings are also reported for anti-spyware adoption 
[14, 22]. 
Despite the identification of factors that influence security 
behaviors, there is a lack of research that has explored these 
factors qualitatively, and how they may be moderated at the 
individual-level and within the organizational context. In other 
words, we are interested in what may cause high or low levels of 
these researched factors in the workplace. Appendix C provides 
an overview of the literature-driven framework to be explored in 
the current study. 
1.5 Methods in Security Research 
Quantitative methods have been primarily adopted in security 
research such as questionnaire studies that adopt regression 
models to investigate the degree to which factors influence ISP 
compliance [e.g. 24, 30], or security behaviors [e.g. 40].  
Behavioral intention is seen as most proximate to behavior and is 
viewed as the best predictor of behavior [56]. Intention is the 
individual’s motivation to undertake the desired behavior. Most 
existing research explores intention as it’s easier to measure (self-
reports) than actual behavior (objective measure). With the 
exception of some studies [58] which obtained objective security 
data about employees, there is over-reliance on this subjective 
measure. Research has indicated that intention only accounts for a 
third of the variance in actual behavior [48]. Research needs to 
focus on actual behaviors rather than focusing on intention to act.   
Qualitative methods have been used to explore security behavior 
but have received less attention. This research has adopted a 
number of techniques including one-to-one interviews [4, 8, 53] 
and diary studies [31]. The lack of adoption of qualitative 
methods might be due to the potentially intrusive nature of 
information security research and concerns for business reputation 
of recruited organizations [34]. These concerns may be 
heightened due to rises in the number of security breaches in 
recent years and the imposition of fines on organizations by 
bodies such as the ICO.  
Qualitative studies are useful to explore the motivators of and 
barriers to information security behaviors. Exploratory and 
inductive in nature, they aim to generate data pertinent to a 
research question that is not necessarily confounded by a 
particular theory or paradigm. However, there has been little 
research using a deductive approach. Deductive approaches 
within behavior change literature are quite common. Elicitation 
studies are one form of a deductive approach. These are useful for 
ensuring that beliefs and attitudes are data-driven from the 
population rather than pre-determined by previous research and 
the research team’s preconceptions [18]. They can be used prior 
to questionnaire development [3, 38]. As the current study is 
interested in the interplay of factors that are part of these behavior 
change models for security behaviors, a deductive approach was 
considered more appropriate as it made space to understand how 
these factors may differ for different security behaviors and 
allowed additional themes to emerge that may have not been 
identified within previous research.  
Behavior change models have been used to categorize qualitative 
data as they allow the exploration of the constructs of the theory 
with a target group [e.g. 46] and as a framework to analyze 
existing qualitative data in finance-related security behavior [15]. 
Apart from some research [15], this approach has remained 
relatively untapped in the information security domain.  
1.6 Research Aims and Research questions 
The present study aims to explore what influences secure and 
insecure practice within the workplace by understanding 
employees’ attitudes, beliefs and security behavior. This study 
adopts a deductive approach to elicit behavioral determinants 
which have been previously explored in IS research. The 
following research questions are to be addressed:  
RQ1. What are the influencers of employees’ secure and 
insecure behavior and how might they differ across 
behaviors?  
RQ2. What are the potential barriers to security behaviors? 
2. METHOD 
2.1 Approach 
This study used a semi-structured qualitative approach and 
employed framework analysis to elicit factors that influence 
security behaviors through one-to-one interviews. Interviews were 
chosen over focus groups as the topic of security was deemed 
sensitive due to its links to employees’ job performance.  
The vignettes formed the focus for the interviews. 16 vignettes 
were developed for the current study covering the security 
behavioral categories identified from a review of ISPs collated 
from organizations (see appendix A). Vignettes were used as a 
tool to help engage participants with cyber security discussion in 
interviews. The nature of this research requires the disclosure of 
insecure practice and honest discussion from employees, the 
social desirability of this behavior and because it is directly linked 
to job performance may mean that this information is difficult to 
elicit from employees. Vignettes are versatile and can be used for 
a number of purposes including icebreakers to build rapport with 
participants, elicit attitudes and beliefs about a topic, and 
investigate topics that are sensitive to respondents [7]. They have 
been used for a variety of sensitive issues [26], and with 
vulnerable groups [6] in research.  
Following advice from previous research, the vignettes were 
designed to remain relatively mundane and avoid unusual events 
and characters, whilst also appearing realistic [6, 19]. They also 
provided enough contextual information to enable a clear 
understanding of the situation but were ambiguous enough to 
ensure that multiple solutions exist [57]. The vignettes were 
designed around common security incidents related to the eleven 
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categories identified from the ISPs (appendix A). Additional 
vignettes were provided for categories, which had many sub-
categories. Common security incidents were identified through 
security provider’s reports (e.g. McAfee, PwC), news reports, and 
the researcher’s knowledge and experience. The vignettes focused 
upon low expertise behaviors, what research [53] has defined as 
“naïve mistakes” rather than focusing on malicious behaviors. The 
wording of vignettes was particularly important to ensure that they 
did not influence the respondent [57] so we designed the vignettes 
to avoid the consequences of the character’s action (as we were 
interested in assessing perceived severity). The vignettes therefore 
remained ambiguous in whether the behavior and situation 
portrayed was secure or insecure. By avoiding the consequences 
of the characters action, we would be able to assess participants’ 
perceptions of the consequences. This approach is emphasized in 
research [47] which argues that vignettes should have unresolved 
issues and finish at the high of tension in the story. The vignettes 
were neutral and covered behaviors people may not perceive as 
insecure but are known to be risky from a security perspective.   
2.2 Participants 
A purposeful sample of 20 participants was recruited from two 
organizations from the North East of the UK. We initially only 
had access to interview 10 participants from organization 2. We 
had the intention of interviewing more however we found that 
during data analysis that the same comments were emerging 
which suggested that interviewing more participants would not 
have led to further insight. The final sample size was adequate for 
framework analysis [43] and we were fortunately granted access 
to external companies, despite the known difficulties of sample 
access with this research topic in qualitative research [34]. All 
participants met the following criteria: (1) currently in full time 
employment, (2) used a computer for work on a daily basis and 
(3) dealt with sensitive information classified under the DPA or 
information sensitive to their company’s intellectual property. 
2.2.1 Organization 1: A University 
5 males and 5 females took part, aged 25-49 years (mean 33.5, 
SD=9.07). Job tenure ranged from 9 months to 15 years with an 
average of 3.78 (SD=4.25) years. 4 participants had permanent 
contracts whilst 6 had temporary. All participants used a computer 
for more than 4 hours daily. Only 1 participant had read the ISP. 
All participants used personally-owned devices in the workplace 
and 9 conducted work tasks on their personally-owned devices. 7 
participants also stored personal data on their work devices. 
2.2.2 Organization 2: Industry Research Group 
4 males and 6 females aged between 26-57 years (mean 39.10, 
SD=10.61). Job tenure ranged from 5 months to 27 years with an 
average of 11.12 (SD=10.89) years. 8 participants had permanent 
contracts whilst 2 had temporary. 9 participants used the computer 
for more than 4 hours daily whilst 1 used the computer for 3-4 
hours. 9 participants had read the ISP: 2 had read the policy in the 
last 1-6 months, 2 had read the policy 6-12 months ago, and 5 in 
more than 12 months ago. All participants used personally-owned 
devices in the workplace and 6 conducted work tasks on these. 7 
participants stored personal data on their work devices.  
2.3 Procedure and Interview Guide 
The study received approval from the faculty ethics board. 
Participants who met the criteria for participation were recruited 
using internal emails in the participating organizations. 
Participants were interviewed individually, in a private room at 
their organization and upon arrival were asked to read an 
information sheet covering all aspects of the investigation, 
including the purpose of the study and what they were required to 
do. They then provided written informed consent. Upon study 
commencement, participants were first required to complete a 
demographic questionnaire. They then took part in a semi-
structured interview lasting 45-60 minutes. The interview was 
designed to be semi-structured to allow exploration of the initial 
framework and key issues and themes pertinent to the research 
question, while also allowing flexibility to probe unexpected 
topics raised by the participant [27]. An interview guide (see 
appendix B) was developed to elicit the behavioral influencers, 
which have been previously investigated in security research.  
Participants were first introduced to a topic area (from the review 
of ISPs - see appendix A for full list of topic areas covered) in 
which the researcher provided a short description of the topic to 
ensure that the broad scope of information security was covered 
within the interviews. Participants were then presented with a 
vignette related to individual behaviors from the topic area. The 
vignettes were used to provide a safe way to open discussion 
around security for each topic and to encourage honest disclosure 
from participants. Upon presentation, participants were asked to 
imagine, drawing on his or her own experience, how they would 
react in that scenario. Following this, discussion centered on how 
participants currently behave in the workplace in relation to the 
ISP areas. At this point, the interview guide was used to elicit 
behavioral influencers for the behaviors discussed. We were also 
interested in potential factors that were not covered by the 
previous research and as such, further discussion for potential 
factors or reasons for their behavior not covered by the interview 
guide was encouraged.  
Upon completion of the study, participants were presented with a 
debrief sheet which fully explained the purpose of the 
investigation and re-emphasized participants right to withdraw 
their data. Participants were all entered into a prize draw to win a 
£50 Amazon voucher.    
3. ANALYSIS 
The data was transcribed verbatim and analyzed in NVivo 9 using 
the principles of framework analysis [44]. The five-step procedure 
was used [52]: (i) the researcher is immersed in the data by 
transcribing and re-reading transcripts; (ii) identify emergent 
themes from the data. The current study identified these a priori 
from previous research, which formed the basis for the initial 
framework. However, new themes were allowed to emerge that 
were unaccounted for by the a priori framework and allowed the 
data to dictate the themes [44]. (iii) The data was then indexed in 
correspondence to the themes within the framework. (iv) Charts 
are used to arrange the data that was previously indexed in the 
third stage. The use of charts and maps allowed the data to be 
classified under headings that relate to the thematic framework. 
(v) The final stage, mapping and interpretation, involved the 
development of a schematic diagram from the analysis to guide 
the interpretation of the data. It was important that in the final 
stage that any conclusions drawn from the data echoed the 
underlying attitudes, beliefs and values of the participants [52]. 
Upon completion, two other researchers conducted a mini-audit of 
the analysis done by the lead researcher who were given the initial 
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coding, quotes and identified any emerging themes for stages 2 
and 3 of the framework analysis. Upon data completion, the two 
researchers also checked the final themes and associated quotes. 
4. THEMES 
Seven themes emerged from the framework analysis of the data. 
Appendix C provides a visual comparison of the initial and final 
framework. From the initial framework, self-efficacy, attitude and 
social pressures were not present however knowledge, experience, 
personal and work boundaries and security responsibility did 
emerge from the framework analysis.  
Appendix D provides visualizations for each of these themes and 
Table 1 provides an overview of these themes.  
Table 1. Emergent themes from the framework analysis 
Theme Brief description 
Response 
Evaluation 
Assessment of security behaviors as 
characterized by response efficacy, perceived 
benefits & response costs 
Threat 
Evaluation 
Appraisal of the threats to information security 
as influenced by individual threat models, 
susceptibility, severity & information 
sensitivity appraisal 
Knowledge 
Knowledge of security risks and security 
actions & the sources that contribute to this 
Experience 
Previous experience of security including 
security breaches & work experience 
Security 
Responsibility 
Employees perception of who is responsible 
for security in their workplace 
Personal & 
Work 
Boundaries 
Boundaries between personal & work life 
Security 
Behavior 
The actions employees take to ensure 
information security, categorized as high, 
medium or low security hygiene 
Overall, we found no major differences between participants from 
each organization. The findings will therefore be discussed 
together; however any identified differences will be explained.  
4.1.1 Response evaluation 
Prior to undertaking a security action, employees evaluate the 
response and its associated outcomes. This is referred to as 
response evaluation, which is characterized by response efficacy, 
perceived benefits and response costs.  
4.1.1.1 Response costs 
Findings suggest that employees make a decision about whether 
to behave securely based upon an appraisal of the costs associated 
with the behavior. The major cost is the degree to which it 
impacts upon job productivity as there appears to be a 
“productivity threshold” regarding security actions. When the 
productivity threshold is reached, it can lead to a number of 
behavioral outcomes. For instance, the employee may circumvent 
the security process or disregard the security behavior. This was 
apparent for behaviors relating to information access such as 
password restrictions on information or accessing documents 
stored on servers.  Furthermore, tasks such as restarting the work 
computer for security updates were also seen as impacting upon 
productivity. Employees recognise the disturbance these prompts 
for restart cause to their workflow and will subsequently postpone 
the task until a period of low activity or until the end of the 
working day.  
“I will postpone it, postponing security updates happens a lot 
because they usually time them at really inconvenient times.. it’s 
like well do you want me to do my job?....” (P14, Org2) 
This security vs. productivity imbalance is also evident in 
software acquisition procedures. Organizations often place 
restrictions on the software employees can install on their work 
machines, requiring administration rights and authorization for the 
installation of new software. There were organizational 
differences in the current study with regards to how the companies 
mandate software acquisition. The university has a very restrictive 
policy in which employees do not have administration rights and 
must seek IT services to approve and install additional software. 
The industry research group had a less restrictive system allowing 
employees to freely install software. Both organizations had the 
option of allowing employees to install authorized licensed 
software from the company network. However, the lack of 
installation restriction within the research institution meant that 
employees did not consider the licensing agreements of certain 
software and would download software (such as freeware) without 
consultation. The official procedures for software acquisition were 
considered “time consuming” and requiring budget approval 
indicating monetary costs associated with acquiring legitimate 
software. Employees assumed that they would not gain budget 
approval and had developed a “don’t bother” attitude with regards 
to official procedures which leads to risky software acquisition. 
“because I know it is going to end up as a no anyway I just don’t 
bother with that.. just save yourself the grief and go and get the 
free thing, that does the job equally well without the hassle..” 
(P14, Org1)  
Correct software acquisition had the largest response cost – 
reduced productivity as it directly affects employees “doing their 
job”. Monetary costs typically referred to the acquisition of 
software for personal devices (such as purchasing anti-virus).  
Cognitive demands were another major cost which occurred as a 
result of using passwords. Employees have a number of 
passwords to remember and different password requirements are 
set for different systems, resulting in high cognitive demand. 
“Well passwords.. after many years using computers the 
passwords just get longer and more complicated to remember, 
most of them are just randomly generated letters and numbers 
which can make them hard to remember especially if you.. well 
especially if you have to change them” (P6, Org1) 
Not all security behaviors have response costs, as some actions 
require minimal time and effort by the user. Specifically the 
security behaviors of locking the computer, keeping a clear screen 
and desk policy, and checking physical environments when 
working in public locations were seen as having minimal costs. 
Employees identified that although these behaviors have smaller 
costs, a “habit” was required to ensure they follow through with 
the action.  
“.. there is no real effort on my part and I mean ultimately it is 
CTRL ALT DEL and you have locked your computer and that’s 
all it is.. so it’s not exactly an effort from my perspective.. that’s 
probably it.. it doesn’t delay me or put a burden on what I am 
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doing generally.... I would be a little bit more resistant if there 
was a lot more effort for me to do stuff…” (P14, Org2) 
Previous research has mixed findings with regards to response 
costs and security behaviors [14, 22, 25, 30]. The current study 
suggests that each security behavior may have a different set of 
response costs that are not equally as costly as suggested by the 
ISP compliance paradigm. These differences in response costs for 
each security behavior may account for the mixed results in the 
security literature.  The findings also support the “compliance 
budget” which suggests that individuals’ choice to comply or not 
comply is determined by the perceived costs and benefits [8]. 
4.1.1.2 Perceived benefits  
Overall, employees’ understood the benefits of security behaviors 
in terms of protection of information and technology from 
malicious others, and maintaining confidentiality of data.  
“advantages are that you can keep your information secure.. you 
can be confident that you’re taking responsibility” (P2, Org1) 
There was also an overall perception of “layers of security” in 
which the individual security actions help contribute to the overall 
picture of information security.  
“It’s like having a burglary, if you leave your door open it’s like 
inviting someone in but if you put extra locks on, it’s deterring 
them so I think the stronger your password is, the more of a 
deterrent it is to people..”  (P8, Org1) 
Employees also gain reassurance that their actions are aiding 
information security and they feel safer in what they are doing.  
“I like it (anti-virus) because I think it’s important, it gives you an 
element of security that what you are using is safe… so you don’t 
have to worry as much..” (P18, Org2) 
“..well I think having it there, whether its effective or not just 
makes me feel just a little bit safer..” (P1, Org1) 
4.1.1.3 Response efficacy  
The findings indicated that employees struggle to evaluate the 
effectiveness of security actions as they lack awareness and 
feedback of the result of their behavior.  
“I don’t know, if you password protected it whether somebody 
could still access it, I don’t know. I guess they probably could” 
(P4, Org1) 
Feedback appears to be playing a major role when employees 
evaluate the effectiveness of a security behavior. Employees don’t 
receive information about their efforts so they are unaware of the 
utility of the security action. This indicates an “action-feedback” 
gap in employees’ information security efforts. 
“They say that if you don’t notice something has gone wrong that 
is a sign of effectiveness, that’s what they say so I am gonna go 
with I think it is working (anti-virus software)” (P14, Org2) 
Furthermore, employees’ response efficacy is capped as there was 
an overall “sense of insecurity” in that they believe hackers or the 
IT savvy will always be able get access, undermining the 
effectiveness of their efforts. However, they do perceive their 
efforts as effective against the average person or criminal.  
“I think it’s (encryption) effective.. if someone really wants to find 
out what is on there.. they will find out.. if they are a hacker.. but 
it’s enough to stop.. like if Joe picked it up and put it into his 
computer and it said you can’t read this file because it is 
password protected or encrypted in some way.. it may be enough 
to stop him and just hand it and say I have found this.. so again I 
think it is a good enough deterrent and as I say if someone for 
whatever reason really wanted what was on that stick.. I am sure 
they could find ways of cracking the encryption but it is a good 
enough deterrent for 90% of the population..” (P19, Org2) 
Perceived benefits and response efficacy are types of outcome 
expectancies. Outcome expectancy is present in many of the 
theories of behavior. An individual’s perceived benefit of security 
behaviors has received little research within security. Research 
has investigated users’ perceived benefits of email security 
behavior, using the health belief model, on security behavior and 
supported the relationship [40]. However, this conceptualization 
refers to a user’s perceived effectiveness of the behavior or 
“response efficacy”. Perceived benefits in the current study, refers 
to individual’s estimation of the advantages of engaging in 
security behaviors which may be distinct from an individual’s 
efficacious perceptions.  
At the end of the session, participants were asked to pick three 
security behaviors that they perceived to be most important for 
information security. The findings indicated that access control 
behaviors were perceived to be most important for security (n=19; 
such as using strong passwords and changing passwords 
regularly), followed by offline security behaviors (n=9, such as 
locking computer or using locked cabinets) and an awareness and 
responsibility of security (n=7, such as personal responsibility and 
treating information confidentially). Using security software (n=6) 
and security with removable media (n=4) were also seen as 
important. Internet (n=3) and email (n=2) security, company 
procedures (n-2), business continuity practices (n=1) and personal 
usage (n=1) were less prevalent. The findings indicate that whilst 
employees struggle to evaluate security actions, they do place 
more importance on some security behaviors over others, 
particularly behaviors related to access control.  
The role of response efficacy has received little attention in 
research to date. Previous research has supported the relationship 
between response efficacy and factors such as intention to comply 
with security policies [30], attitude toward security policies [25], 
and intention to adopt anti-spyware software [14, 22, 33]. 
However, recent research has found contrasting findings [49, 55]. 
The current study highlights a potential barrier to high response 
efficacy, as employees cannot evaluate their security efforts as 
they lack feedback on their performance. However, they did 
indicate which behaviors they think are most effective for security 
with those relating to access controls having most perceived 
utility. Protection motivation theory argues that response efficacy 
is part of a person’s coping appraisal and that higher levels of 
response efficacy will increase the likelihood of engaging in the 
behavior. This study suggests that employees do not receive 
feedback or information regarding security actions and the 
effectiveness of these actions. Response efficacy may therefore be 
a potential barrier to security behavior within the workplace. 
4.1.2 Threat Evaluation 
A number of factors that affect threat appraisal were identified.  
4.1.2.1 Information Sensitivity Appraisal   
Employees felt that the information they work with has different 
levels of sensitivity. However, perceptions of low data sensitivity 
were more prevalent in this sample. Their appraisal seemed to be 
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based on an assessment of the “value” of the information. This 
entailed a comparison to data with a perceived higher value such 
as health-related and financial-related information.   
“Again, vulnerable in the respect that I could probably do more 
but at the same time, I am not sure what other people could do 
with the stuff that I leave lying around, it’s not highly confidential 
or anything like that... I haven’t got peoples’ bank details or 
anything like that..” (P9, Org1) 
“I think you have got to think of a better way of giving yourself a 
reminder than having that exposed especially if it has got patient.. 
at that level healthcare that’s.. you couldn’t take any chances 
with that sort of thing so..” (P12, Org2) 
Furthermore, employees’ appraisal involved consideration of the 
information’s “audience” and their preconceptions of who can use 
the data.     
“..there is no objective value to this information that somebody 
has given us.. because to the vast majority of people it means 
absolutely nothing.. it’s pointless and they would not be bothered 
even if they were found out”(P2, Org1) 
These findings support research that found that employee’s 
perceptions of information sensitivity interacted with their 
perceptions of organizational security [2],  rated information 
about individuals as more sensitive than commercially sensitive 
information and placed security as a higher priority on some 
information. This study demonstrates this appraisal through 
employees’ evaluation of the information’s value and audience.  
4.1.2.2 Susceptibility 
Perceptions of susceptibility to security threats appeared to be an 
important factor in the employees’ behavior. The perception 
varied between employees and the nature of the threat - offline or 
online.  
Offline threats to information and systems involve physical 
attempts to infiltrate the information security of organizations, 
which can include the attempts of outsiders or malicious 
employees.  Perceived susceptibility to these kinds of threats 
appears to be low amongst most employees. Individuals perceive 
that offline threats will be malicious others acting in a more 
opportunistic manner rather than pre-meditated. They appear to 
hold an optimism bias with offline threats, believing they are not 
at risk of being a victim and comparing the likelihood of a 
physical threat to other employees or other organizations.  
“Yeah the physical security I feel fairly protected.. I would say 
also because of the likelihood of people who surround me to come 
and search through my files is just next to zero so yeah I feel very 
secure” (P3, Org1) 
“so in that respect it’s probably absolutely safe 99.99% of the 
time to leave completely personal information all over your 
computer and leave it unlocked because the majority of people 
that come into contact with it will not be interested and not want 
access to it and not want to do anything with it.. so it’s only to 
protect for that minority of times.. for that possibility that 
somebody might want it and want access to it..” (P2, Org1) 
With regards to online threats, the employees perceived 
themselves to be highly susceptible. There appeared to be an 
overall sense of insecurity or learned helplessness when it comes 
to behavior online. This is particularly related to employees’ 
response efficacy. Individuals’ have an estimation of the 
effectiveness of different types of security behaviors and practices, 
however they feel that “hackers can still get access” and the “IT 
savvy can still bypass security”. Employees understand the 
importance of security behaviors but feel that their efforts can be 
circumvented regardless. 
“I have no idea.. probably they are (passwords) effective if you 
are going to protect yourself against somebody.. if you wanna 
kind of see security from the person next to you however in terms 
of people whose job it is to break passwords.. probably not very 
effective and I do realize that there are people out there whose 
vocation is to break peoples’ passwords and virus peoples’ 
computers…” (P3, Org1) 
“For somebody like me I think your password would be enough to 
bar me from accessing your information, logging into your 
computer but I think somebody who had good sound IT 
knowledge could probably bypass them and get into other 
peoples’ information” (P16, Org2) 
The relationship between levels of susceptibility and engagement 
in security behaviors has mixed support in the literature. Its 
relationship with ISP compliance intention has consistently been 
supported [30, 49] as has its role in anti-virus software usage [36]. 
A potential reason for the lack of support in previous studies is 
that their conceptualization of threats is often non-specific and 
they do not refer to types of threat [e.g. 55].  This study 
demonstrates that an individual’s threat assessment differs 
depending upon an online or offline threat, with online having 
higher perceived vulnerability amongst employees. Previous 
studies do not make this distinction when assessing perceptions of 
susceptibility. Perceived susceptibility to online threats is closely 
linked with response efficacy, i.e. they do not believe they are 
protected even if they behave securely.    
4.1.2.3 Threat models 
Employees appear to have a variety of security threat models. This 
is dependent on their knowledge of security risks, their 
perceptions of appropriate security actions and perceived 
likelihood of threats. For example, there appears to be a large 
discrepancy in attitudes towards writing down passwords. Some 
employees perceive this as being highly insecure and would not 
engage in this behavior, suggesting that they are more concerned 
with physical threats than online threats in password security. 
“I am quite conscious that someone can find a scrap of paper that 
I have written with important company stuff on so I don’t do that.. 
even for my personal stuff I don’t do it” (P11, Org2) 
Some employees may perceive this as being insecure but 
determine the likelihood of an online threat as greater than an 
offline threat. 
“I just have like a note.. well.. I have a note with all passwords 
for all the different places where I need stuff, like online because 
there is too many passwords to remember so I need to have them 
written down somewhere..” (P1, Org1) 
Other differences were notable in threat perceptions of working 
remotely and allowing unauthorized users to use work devices, 
locking work computers, and using encryption on removable 
media. 
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4.1.2.4 Severity  
There was disparity in perceived severity of security breaches and 
of security non-compliance across different domains.  Employees 
were mainly aware of the consequences to their organization’s 
reputation and the potential implications of this. For example, 
competitors getting hold of their company’s intellectual property 
and breaching government legislation.  
“again other than the competitive threat that we are developing 
something that we don’t want the competition to know about and 
they get access to that information... you know something like that 
I guess would be of value to the competition so that they would 
then have time to put a counter strategy together”(P16, Org2) 
Employees were highly aware of the impact to technology from a 
security breach. This was primarily the consequences of 
downloading a virus or other malicious software. 
“I suppose technically it could affect the whole university system 
which would cause massive outrage and whatever, so I think you 
would get into a lot of trouble for doing stuff like that and I think 
it would have large consequences” (P9, Org1) 
Perceptions of personal consequences were mixed; employees 
were not aware of how their company would react if they caused a 
breach in security. Employees assumed it might lead to 
disciplinary action or impact their own and companies’ 
productivity. Employees seemed to consider the consequences to 
others less although did mention dissatisfied service users and 
distressed service users.  
“I am aware of the kind of potential problems that you could 
cause, and the stress you could cause people if any information 
was disclosed about a particular person but I don’t know if I did 
something that caused a problem within the university systems I 
don’t know what action would be taken” (P7, Org1) 
Previous research has focused on the role of perceived severity in 
ISP compliance [25, 49], and anti-spyware adoption [14, 22]. The 
role of perceived severity on anti-virus adoption [36], being 
cautious with emails that have attachments [40] and other ISP 
literature [30] is unclear. Our findings suggest there are different 
levels to an individual’s perceived consequences or perceived 
severity. These are consequences to the organization, technology, 
3rd parties and to the self. Within these levels, knowledge of the 
consequences also differs with less awareness of consequences to 
others and to oneself. This suggests that an individual’s perceived 
severity is not one overall construct but may comprise of different 
types of severity implications. This may account for the 
differences in existing research.  
4.1.3 Experience 
Experience related to individuals experiences of security beaches 
and previous work experience.  
4.1.3.1 Security breach experience  
 The current study suggests that previous experience appears to be 
important for current behavior. Previous job roles and experiences 
of security threats (including viruses and phishing emails) appear 
to promote awareness and secure behavior.  An employee’s 
experience of security breaches can lead to different courses of 
action depending upon their evaluation of an effective response to 
the breach. Employees’ reported “security overreactions” in which 
they undertake inappropriate continuity behavior or take a 
“scattergun approach” to dealing with the breach by engaging in 
multiple behaviors to ensure recovery and continuity (e.g. deleting 
all contacts and changing all passwords). 
“I mean once.. something must have happened to my email 
address, my yahoo email address because people were just 
getting emails just saying “try this money making scheme” so as 
soon as I got that.. I deleted everyone off my contact lists because 
I had them somewhere else and changed my passwords and 
things like that..” (P2, Org1) 
Other reported “security overreactions” were non-use of accounts 
and concluding that devices should be thrown out following a 
virus infection. 
 “I could see that it is not a right file and I have no idea why I 
clicked on it and the computer is now very slow and unusable so 
we are going to be binning it or selling it for parts.. no reason for 
that and it shouldn’t be happening.. and we know that we should 
never disable the anti-virus” (P3, Org1) 
These experiences typically refer to personal experiences; 
however work-related experience is also important for secure 
behavior especially when it impacts on employees’ productivity. 
For example, an employee’s organization experienced a virus 
breach leading to implications that affected the whole business 
operation. 
“this is not some pen pusher saying don’t use pen drives.. It’s 
actually really serious and that was a good lesson for me and I 
think a lot of people don’t understand the importance of things 
like that but because I have got experience of what happens.. of 
what could go wrong.. when it goes bad.. when it goes wrong it 
goes wrong really badly..” (P15, Org2) 
4.1.3.2 Work experience  
Organizations differ in their approaches to information security 
and subsequently their methods to promote security awareness 
and practices amongst employees. This is known as the “security 
culture” of an organization, which are the shared values and 
assumptions regarding information security. An organizations’ 
culture is idiosyncratic so there will be differences in the levels of 
security culture across companies.  Employees discussed transfer 
of their behavior from previous organizations; this appears to be 
more evident in employees who come from organizations with a 
higher security culture than their current employer. 
“Again from my previous job there was.. it was a very secretive 
company and there was a lot of examples where there was 
competitor espionage and things like that.. it was a very regular 
occurrence and a very serious thing so security was.. it was like 
Fort Knox over there most of the time so it just got drilled into 
you to lock your computer work station so that is just something 
that I brought with me to this job.. I notice that a lot of people 
don’t lock their work stations here” (P11, Org2) 
However, not all behaviors are transferred, there appears to be a 
threshold where employees will not transfer the behavior if it 
requires too much effort on their part. For example, strong 
password enforcements in previous companies do not lead 
employees to adopt a strong password management practice in 
their current job if it is not enforced.  
“I have had the same password for the last 6 and a half years ... I 
know I should change that, in my previous employer we got sent a 
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reminder to change the password,…every three months we had to 
change our password… I know I should change it but I just don’t 
have the memory space to do that.. I would forget what I had 
changed it to” (P9, Org1) 
Experience has received little investigation in previous research 
and has largely been supported in terms of anti-spyware usage 
[51], adoption of online privacy protections [59], and adoption of 
virus protection behavior [36]. These findings suggest that 
previous breach experience is important for current behavior. 
Furthermore, employees’ experiences of security in previous jobs 
are also important and potential transferability of behavior has not 
been formally explored in employee security behavior. 
4.1.4 Security-related knowledge 
The theme of security knowledge comprises of sources of 
knowledge and knowledge of specific domains (i.e. security risks 
and security actions). 
4.1.4.1 Security risks  
This study revealed that knowledge of security risks is diverse and 
varies depending upon security behaviors and security threats. 
Awareness of risks specific to poor password management is most 
prevalent and indicates that employees are able to identify the 
risks associated with: using poor passwords, not changing 
passwords, disclosure of passwords, recycling passwords and 
writing passwords down. Furthermore knowledge of risks 
associated with employees having administrative rights, risks 
when working remotely, viruses, and social engineering tactics 
such as phishing emails were also high. Knowledge of risks 
associated with mobile devices, removable media and physical 
security was mixed, with mobile devices in particular an area 
where employees lack awareness of the risks of using mobile 
devices and the potential vulnerability of these devices. 
4.1.4.2 Security actions  
Employees’ knowledge of security actions was also mixed, 
particularly with regards to those that are formally set in their 
organizations’ ISP. Analysis revealed differences in employees’ 
knowledge of the security policy and its associated procedures 
between the two recruited companies. Information from the 
demographic questionnaire indicated that in the academic 
institution only 1 employee had read the policy compared to the 
other organization in which 8 had read their companies’ policy. 
Whilst reading the policy does not indicate compliance to it or 
awareness of the entire content, it does appear to be a source of 
reference for some employees when determining appropriate 
security actions. Those who are unaware of their ISPs rely on their 
own awareness of appropriate security actions when behaving 
with information and technology. Consequently, they report 
relying on other sources of knowledge to inform appropriate 
security actions (such as recommendations from fellow 
employees).  
In terms of security actions, encryption for removable media and 
work devices was the security action in which employees lacked 
most awareness of and sometimes there was clear confusion 
between the differences between encryption and password 
protection. Other security actions employees appeared to be 
knowledgeable of were those associated with authenticating users, 
physical security of information and technology, and the 
prevention of malicious software.  Two-factor verification for 
account access (e.g. cloud storage) was mentioned less and could 
be a potential behavior that requires further awareness.  
4.1.4.3 Sources of Knowledge  
Employees sourced security information from individuals within 
their workplace or social circle whom they regard as having “IT 
expertise”. In the workplace this was employees from the IT 
department or colleagues/friends with IT expertise.  
“.. I think it’s pretty good.. I have got windows laptops and I have 
got a mac and.. I have done research on the different virus 
software that you can use which is freely available.. I only use the 
freeware stuff.. and I have asked my friends as well  who are quite 
up on computers and what not and I make sure that I use kind of 
the same ones that they do..”  (P1, Org1) 
To a lesser extent, fellow colleagues and line management were 
sources of knowledge and this most commonly related to the 
receiving of suspicious emails or files, in which case they would 
seek information from their immediate peers before contacting “IT 
expertise” sources. Other sources of knowledge reported were 
company procedures such as the information security policy or 
professional codes of conducts, which cover aspects relating to 
the integrity of information and its security. For example, one 
employee has to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDA) with 
service users and this influences her behavior. 
“I probably used to leave my computer unlocked more.. but in the 
job that I do now we have to sign non-disclosure agreements so if 
you are working with a university on certain things or different 
companies you have to sign NDAs and there have been some 
projects which have been deemed as pretty secret I guess so you 
have to sign them and say that you won’t talk to anybody about 
them.. you won’t.. and as part of signing them it says when you 
leave your desk you must lock your PC.. you will adhere to this 
and stuff so I am very aware of doing that..” (P19, Org2) 
The media was another source of information such as reports 
about hacking to consumers and organizations and their 
associated consequences such as identity theft and fraud-related 
experience (individual) and network disruption and reputation 
(organizational). Media reports relating to security risks and their 
implications were also noted, such as government bodies losing 
unencrypted USB sticks with sensitive information on them.  
“Well.. so far it’s not too bad other than there has been a few 
cases where we have seen.. Facebook or LinkedIn passwords 
being cracked so the information that I have got on Facebook 
isn’t particularly of interest but of course then when you go into 
online banking and everything that’s when it starts to get a bit 
scary..” (P17, Org2) 
4.1.5 Personal and work boundaries 
An important factor influencing secure and insecure behaviors is 
the degree to which individuals engage in personal activities on 
their work devices and the boundaries they have between home 
and the workplace. Those who reported strong boundaries 
between home and work limit the personal usage they conduct 
(e.g. using work email for work-use only and limiting personal 
browsing). 
 “Well actually when I am at work I just do work and usually the 
sites and places that I visit on the web are educational resources.. 
I don’t really surf the web and stuff and don’t just click on 
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random links... I just stick to work related things and like I 
assume those kind of resources are pretty clear” (P12, Org2) 
These strong boundaries extend to outside the physical workplace 
and relate to the use of work devices for personal usage when 
working remotely. Employees with strong personal boundaries 
said they use work devices solely for work purposes and don’t 
allow unauthorized users (e.g. family, friends) to use them. 
“Don’t let anyone else use the computer. No one would want to 
use the computer anyway but I don’t let anyone else use it... I 
don’t like leave it in anyone else’s care.. it’s always kind of, 
under my own care because it’s not my computer to pass around” 
(P8, Org1) 
These individuals also demonstrate a preference for using work-
issued devices over their personal devices for work tasks. They 
may therefore be less likely to engage in BYOD activities.  
“Try not use personal devices.. that is as close as it gets.. I just 
view it as a work one, it’s just that I am using it with two different 
works.. I don’t use.. I think it’s important in my mind having that 
line for a couple of reasons.. the information that is coming out of 
work, I don’t want it stored on my home stuff for any trace of it..”  
(P4, Org1)  
The role of technology in employees’ work/life balance is well 
documented in organizational psychology literature. Ubiquitous 
access to the workplace can enhance individual productivity but 
can also inflate individual’s stress levels leading to job burnout 
[42]. A strong work life balance may also be important for 
security. Limiting working remotely is important for security as it 
can reduce security risks associated with working outside of the 
workplace. Individuals with a high work/life balance limit doing 
work tasks outside of the workplace.  
“.. once I leave work that is me done but for serious work.. I know 
for example my boss and other people they have work laptops and 
they can work from home.. they get special  equipment where they 
can do that.. it’s not really applicable to me..” (P14, Org2) 
Employees report feelings of high psychological ownership of 
their personal devices and limit work-related information.  
“Yeah I don’t even know if it is a security conscious thing.. I think 
it is more just.. work/life balance of this is my phone.. I don’t 
want to contaminate it with work stuff… yeah it’s mine, it’s not 
the company’s” (P19, Org2) 
Individuals with blurred boundaries between personal and work 
usage reported being less restrictive in their boundaries and 
engage in personal tasks on work devices. For example, email 
usage for work and personal.  
“I kind of do receive emails from my friends at work coz they also 
work here but I don’t receive emails from my friends who don’t 
work here on that account but at the same time I also have it set 
up so that I do receive my Gmail stuff to that computer as well so 
it sort of kind of blurs the boundaries a little bit” (P6, Org1) 
When working remotely these boundaries are more blurred, 
employees may use work-issued devices for personal usage and 
allow others to use the work devices.  
 “I have done it myself if my nieces have been up and there is only 
one laptop.. like my own personal one and someone wants to do 
something else then I would give them the work laptop to do 
it..”(P19, Org2)   
Employees reporting less distinctive boundaries between home 
and the workplace consequently have a lower work/life balance, 
they prefer ubiquitous access to work information so may use 
their own personal devices to stay connected to work. These 
employees also engage in more personal risky tasks on their work 
machines and disclose their own sensitive information such as 
discussed by the following employee who uses online banking on 
their work computer as they rely on the security of their 
organization and assume that it is more secure than their own 
devices.  
“Because everything on mine (home computer) is what I have put 
onto it or set up to work on it or adjusted the settings and I don’t 
really understand what I am doing with stuff like that so you 
assume that because you get an email from IT services 
periodically that goes to all users that says that we have identified 
a machine which is running malware on the network and they will 
give you the work station name of it and you eventually track it 
down, you assume that because it’s a corporate computer system 
that there is some money and some resource and expertise at 
keeping it safe..” (P13, Org2) 
The use of personal devices in the workplace or BYOD (Bring 
Your Own Device) can bring many advantages for businesses 
including enhanced employee productivity, satisfaction and 
mobility [10]. Despite this, BYOD also leaves organizations open 
to information breaches. Despite calls for organizations to 
implement more stringent BYOD security strategies [10], there is 
little research exploring employee attitudes towards BYOD, the 
factors that influence this form of behavior and the role of 
personal device ownership on information security.  This study 
sheds some light on security behaviors and BYOD activities 
relating to work/life boundaries.  
4.1.6 Security responsibility  
Employees rely heavily on “security experts” in their company to 
maintain their systems, particularly for anti-virus, encryption, and 
installing updates. Employees recognize that it is their 
responsibility to handle passwords and protect data. 
 “To be honest I assume that if that’s what the company tell us to 
use then somebody in the technology area has decided that it is 
secure enough and that our firewalls are there and whatever” 
(P16, Org2) 
Relating to the prevention of viruses and other malicious 
software, employees appear to rely heavily on their organization 
with assumptions that “somebody else is taking care of it” and 
relying on the expertise of IT to ensure that they are protected.  
 “Yeah actually I haven’t checked what it is and how it works and 
whether I should do something about myself or if it’s something 
that just works in the background.. I’m hoping that it’s just 
something that’s in the background and then its updated 
automatically.. I haven’t checked so far, I always just assume 
that’s updated centrally from the IT services” (P10, Org1) 
In adoption of new security practices, diffusion of responsibility 
was apparent. Employees would only adopt a new security 
behavior if the company enforced it, diffusing responsibility to the 
organization to force them. 
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 “Yeah I would be quite happy to do it if the company came out 
and said every USB stick that you put in has to be encrypted and 
yeah I would do it.. again it becomes that another hurdle to get 
through in the productivity of work but I can understand that 
reasoning for it..” (P19, Org2) 
This diffusion of responsibility was not just limited to the 
organizations that the employees work for but to service and 
product providers they use for work tasks. For example, there was 
a general perception that Apple products are more secure so you 
do not need to add any additional security - you can rely on Apple 
for the security.  
 “I have got a mac at home so as far as I know I don’t need any 
security on it.. it has got its own inbuilt” (P12, Org2) 
The current study supports the findings of existing research [17] 
which found that individuals delegate responsibility to one of four 
modalities: technology, individuals, organizations and 
institutions. However, its relationship to specific security 
behaviors in existing quantitative studies has remained relatively 
unexplored.  
4.1.7 Security behavior  
Security behavior refers to an employee’s ability to engage in 
appropriate and effective security actions. Three aspects to 
security behavior were identified and employees categorized 
accordingly, referred to as “security hygiene”, which indicates the 
effectiveness of the security actions employees undertake. The 
previous themes affect the degree to which an individual engages 
in high, medium or low security hygiene. Security hygiene is 
determined by prevention strategies and security citizenship.  
4.1.8 Prevention strategies  
Prevention strategies are behaviors that contribute towards 
information security in the workplace and aim to prevent security 
breaches. For example, not downloading suspicious attachments, 
not clicking on suspicious links online, adopting strong 
passwords, locking computers, encrypting removable media and 
non-disclosure of sensitive information to name a few.  
Employees with high security hygiene take appropriate action and 
take fewer risks with their security behavior. They rely less on 
their organization for security and have a more proactive stance 
towards security. They can also correctly identify whether a 
physical or cyber security deterrent is most suitable for the 
security threat. For example, they will adopt encryption on 
removable media rather than rely on keeping it on oneself.  
“Yeah I use a USB stick with encryption and it’s just a bit of a 
reassurance because having in the past, I haven’t lost a USB stick 
but I have not been able to find it for a few hours, dunno where I 
have put it and so feel a lot more comfortable now where there is 
using a USB stick with actual encryption on and knowing that if it 
did disappear then, you know, there wouldn’t be staff information 
going into the wrong hands..” (P4, Org1) 
Those with medium security hygiene may take appropriate action 
and know which security actions are most suitable but engage in 
more risks with their behavior such as creating less strong 
passwords and then writing it down or locking the desk cabinet 
but leaving the key located within the vicinity. They are less 
proactive in their stance towards information security and rely 
more on their organization for security.  
“I put them in the filling cabinet but I didn’t actually lock it but 
they were out of sight so I suppose that is as far as I went.. I 
didn’t lock but I do remember going I shouldn’t just.. because 
they are so easy.. it’s not like a computer or a laptop that you 
would be seeing walking out with, the mobile phones were just 
too easy to pick up so yeah I put them out of sight but I don’t 
think  I actually locked them” (P10, Org2) 
Employees with low security hygiene, lack awareness of 
appropriate security actions and engage in inappropriate security 
behaviors. They rely heavily on “security defaults” such as using 
the default security password and relying on the computer to auto-
lock when leaving their desk. They are more reactive towards 
security needs and rely on security enforcement by their 
organization for their security behavior. They lack awareness of 
appropriate security actions for physical or cyber security threats 
and as such, they may engage in non-technical deterrents when a 
cyber-security deterrent would be more beneficial. For example, 
relying on physically securing a USB rather than using 
encryption. 
“however the advantages are that I am much more consciously 
aware because 15-20 times a day I need to pick my keys up and I 
would notice if the USB.. because the USB stick is attached to a.. 
like a lanyard thing that goes around your neck so if that was 
missing I would be really consciously aware of it..” (P2, Org1) 
Their behaviors are considered more negligent as they may be 
aware of security actions but fail to perform the behavior.  
“I have kind of blurred the lines a bit by having a laptop, it 
mostly stays at home but when I do take it to work, it’s sensible to 
have a password on but I just don’t for ease of access” (P6, Org1) 
4.1.8.1 Security citizenship 
This refers to actions individuals engage in which aid the 
organization in business continuity and recovery. Individuals with 
high security hygiene seemed to engage in practices such as 
backing up data and informing colleagues of security issues. 
“Well.. the phishing thing.. they are all set up.. I don’t mess 
around with them, I just leave it as it is.. if I see anything dodgy I 
have emailed like IT before and made them aware of it and sent 
them the email”  (P1, Org1) 
Individuals with low security hygiene, on the other hand, rely 
more on their organization for business continuity practices and 
take less responsibility and action to aid the organization.  
“No.. that’s the one thing that I am really a bit confused about, I 
don’t know if there are like official procedures for backing up or 
if I should do it myself..”  (P20, Org2) 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall seven themes emerged through the use of this deductive 
approach that explains why employees engage in security actions. 
The findings of the study suggest that the following relationships 
between the factors may be present (see appendix C for graphical 
overview of the initial and final framework). This study suggests 
that employees’ security behaviors are influenced by their security 
knowledge and prior experience. Prior to carrying out the 
behavior, employees undergo threat and response evaluations. 
Knowledge and prior experience also influence these evaluations. 
Additionally, their perceptions of responsibility and boundaries 
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between personal and work influence behavior. Finally, the 
interplay of all these factors influences the degree to which 
employees engage in security behaviors. This study indicates that 
there are different levels of security behavior characterized by 
prevention strategies and security citizenship.  
The use of the deductive approach incorporated factors from many 
behavior change theories which allowed the comparison of the 
final framework with existing theory. The final framework 
suggests an extended PMT model with other security-contextual 
factors that may be able to explain additional variance in behavior 
if it was to be explored quantitatively and with regression 
analysis. By exploring these constructs qualitatively, we were able 
to explore what leads to high or low levels in these constructs and 
the individual, system and organizational components that may 
influence different perceptions. In doing this, it has provided 
better clarity of the use of PMT in security and may explain the 
disparate findings for a number of PMT constructs (severity and 
response costs).   
The current study has provided a number of contributions to the 
security research area and organizational practice. Firstly, the 
findings demonstrate that ISP compliance is complicated as 
different security behaviors are motivated by different factors and 
to different degrees. Where possible, future research should move 
away from using an ISP compliance paradigm and focus on 
individual security behaviors. Likewise, organizational campaigns 
would benefit more from targeting specific security behaviors. 
Secondly, response efficacy was shown to be a potential barrier to 
some security behaviors, response efficacy is low because 
employees lack feedback on how effective their security behavior 
is at reducing threats. Systems rarely provide enough feedback or 
positive reinforcement to users on their proactive security 
behavior although sometimes provide information on their 
reactive behavior (e.g. weak password or non-updated system). 
Systems need to provide more feedback on their efforts and 
provide information on the effectiveness of these for prevention of 
security threats. Furthermore, employees perceive that their 
security efforts may be in vain as they don’t receive reinforcement 
from their organization/management to keep up their behavior. 
Research shows the importance of management feedback on 
employee performance [23] and the importance of positive 
reinforcement in shaping behavior [50]. One approach may be for 
organizations to include security behavior as part of the 
performance appraisal of employees. As security is part of an 
employee’s job role, it should be given more focus and feedback 
from the attention of management during day-to-day business 
operation and more specifically, as part of their employees’ 
performance appraisal. 
Thirdly, the current study showed that employees undergo an 
information sensitivity assessment, evaluating the sensitivity 
based upon their perceptions of the value of the information and 
the audience for it. The study highlights differences in 
individuals’ threat evaluation; employees’ perceived susceptibility 
differs depending upon off- and online threats. Within 
information security research, off- and online threats are often 
given equal weighting or not specified. However, this study 
suggests that research needs to consider these as two separate 
information security issues (on- vs offline) and campaigns need to 
focus on communicating susceptibility to these threats differently 
to employees and being specific when framing susceptibility 
questions. More work is required to provide concrete definitions 
of sensitivity levels, rather than it being determined in relation to 
other types of information. 
Fourthly, security responsibility was an emergent theme which 
suggested that employees perceived different responsibilities for 
security tasks, some of which they accept responsibility for and 
others they diffuse the responsibility onto their organization. 
Organizations need to be more transparent to employees with 
regards to what they are expected to do and what is within their 
remit. Organizational policies dictate these responsibilities 
however they need to be embedded within the culture of the 
organization. Finally, employees’ personal/work boundaries may 
help explain risky behavior in the workplace and adoption of 
BYOD has implications for these boundaries. These boundaries 
need to be explored further. 
The initial deductive framework included the factors social 
pressures, attitude and self-efficacy however these did not emerge 
within the final framework. Attitude emerged more broadly across 
the other constructs rather than as a separate construct. For 
example, security responsibility and personal/work boundaries 
have attitudinal components within them. For social pressures, 
when discussing security behavior, employees didn’t appear to be 
concerned about the behavior of others and of their line 
management, with regards to their motivations for behaving 
securely. However, this factor may play more of a larger 
component within the security culture of both of the 
organizations. Previous research has explored the role of security 
culture, which is the shared beliefs, norms, values and learned 
ways that have developed through the organization’s history [11] 
and are captured in the mission statements and the vision of the 
organization as they are the values they wish to be known for. A 
poor security culture is one where security is not built into these 
shared assumptions and is not part of “the way things are done 
around here”. In the absence of a security culture, individual-
level motivational factors may play more of an important role as 
information security is at the level of the employee rather than 
driven top-down and across the organization. This may account 
for the lack of discussion around social pressures in the two 
participating companies.  
Self-efficacy proved difficult to assess within an interview context 
and this could be due to difficulties in tapping into an individual’s 
perceived capabilities of engaging in security tasks. Self-efficacy 
may play a latent but difficult to assess role due to impression 
management in organizations [21]. Employees may wish to 
maintain the perception that they are competent in their job roles 
so may not wish to disclose information that may negatively affect 
these perceptions (i.e. an inability to undertake security actions).  
The use of a deductive elicitation approach proved a useful 
application for exploring the factors that influence security 
behavior. Refinement of the initial framework through the 
qualitative data allowed the emergent factors to be driven fully 
from the data set but also allowed comparison with the behavioral 
determinants identified a priori from the existing literature. 
Furthermore by using this approach it allowed exploration of 
theoretical constructs with target populations ensuring that 
behavioral motivators are data-driven rather than pre-determined 
by the research. This is important for behavior change as it allows 
the data from the qualitative interviews to be used for 
questionnaire and intervention development in future research.   
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7. APPENDICES 
7.1 Appendix A- Security behavioral categories and example vignettes 
 
Category Description Vignette 
Remote 
working 
Actions for working on mobile 
devices and in external locations 
Miles is a merchandiser for a large menswear store and constantly travels to other stores 
within the local area.  One of the benefits of Miles's job is that he is given a company 
laptop as he is constantly mobile. Miles has a 15 year old daughter, who he lets use his 
laptop when he doesn't need it as his laptop is of much better quality than his daughter's 
PC. Mile's daughter uses the laptop for playing computer games, however she often 
disables the anti-virus software as it slows down her favorite game. 
Removable 
media 
Portable storage devices that can be 
connected to and removed from a 
computer (e.g. USB sticks) 
Mary works as a Lecturer at the local university, she has an important presentation at a 
national conference in London, 300 miles away from her home. Due to the long train 
journey and therefore intermittent internet connection, Mary decides to store her work on 
a USB stick so that she can continue working on the train from her laptop. The 
documents stored on the device include assignment results, presentation notes and an 
excel document listing the names and addresses of the students enrolled on one of her 
classes. After exiting the train and arriving at the conference location, she realizes that 
she has lost the USB stick. 
User access 
management 
How access controls are allocated 
and managed e.g. passwords 
Matthew is staying late to work on an important assignment which is due the next day, 
Matthew has limited security access to confidential information stored on a company 
password-protected server but he requires a certain document to finish this report. 
Normally, Matthew would have to get authorization from the information owner who 
accesses the file for Matthew but instead the owner gave Matthew their password to 
access the server so that he could do it himself.   
Prevention 
of malicious 
software 
Actions to prevent malicious 
software 
The updates for the anti-virus on Laura's work computer are controlled by her 
organization; however she has to occasionally restart her computer to allow the updates 
to install. Laura is regularly prompted by the anti-virus software to restart the computer 
however Laura keeps postponing this task as she is too busy to wait for her computer to 
restart and for her to re-open the documents she was working on. 
Breaches of 
security 
Steps for recovering and reporting 
security incidences 
Chris is about to go on a two weeks holiday from work and on his last day his computer 
starts acting strangely. For example, the cursor on his computer screen would start to 
move around on its own and new files would appear on his desktop. Chris only realizes 
that something peculiar is going on later that day, rather than reporting it to IT, he 
decides to switch off his computer and deal with the issue on his return. 
Physical 
security 
Strategies to physically protect 
infrastructures, information and 
information resources 
Kimberley works as a secretary in a busy open plan office. Kimberley's work computer 
has access to a number of highly confidential documents. She is normally stationed at 
her desk however at lunch she leaves to have her break in the staff room. During this 
time, Kimberley leaves her computer unlocked. 
Information 
control 
Responsibility in protection, storage 
and processing of information 
Lee is disposing of old records which contain sensitive information about clients. His 
office has two bins for disposing of waste: one for confidential waste and the other for 
general waste. The confidential waste bin is full so Lee puts the old records in the 
general waste bin. 
Software & 
Systems 
Software and system acquisition, 
installation and maintenance 
Anna requires the latest photo editing software for one of her work tasks, the department 
has no budget to purchase any new software, however Anna knows a website where she 
can download an unofficial version of the software. Her work computer allows Anna to 
download and install it. 
Acceptable 
usage 
Appropriate usage of information 
systems, email and the internet 
Beth is a call centre employee and during her work breaks she uses her work computer 
for personal use. She has just booked a holiday to Tenerife which required her to enter 
her personal information and credit card details. 
Continuity 
planning 
Outlines prevention and recovery 
from internal and external threats 
Michelle’s work computer is run by Windows Vista, however she prefers to use her own 
personal laptop which has Windows 8 installed as its operating system.  She brings her 
laptop into work on a daily basis and does all her work tasks on her laptop.  However, 
Michelle does not back up the data that is stored on her personal laptop.  
Compliance 
with 
legislation 
Compliance to legislation acts such 
as the Data Protection Act (1998) 
Sam is a medical doctor and part of this job role requires him to write notes about 
patients during his sessions which contain sensitive and personal information that is 
covered under the DPA (1998). Sam often leaves his notes on his desk in his office.  
Whilst Sam has an office to himself, other staff such as the cleaners can gain access 
when required. 
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7.2 Appendix B: Interview guide  
 
Interview opening:  Focus of session explained to participant   Participant provided with an information sheet  and informed consent granted from participant  Emphasize that participants responses will not be shared with their management/company 
 
Participant to complete demographic questionnaire 
For each topic area for the policy categories:  Provide description of category (e.g. for user access management - Businesses have a number of computer systems to 
store and process data which employees use. Users have to identify themselves with a user ID and a password to 
gain access. Employees may have restrictions on their user access to both computer and information)  Present participant with vignette   Ask participant to imagine, drawing on his or her own experience, how they would react in that scenario  Optional questions 
o What advice would you give? / What should they (the character) be doing to protect themselves? 
<Researcher to then go back to the topic area>  Within your workplace, how do you maintain security when/with <topic area>  Which security behaviors do you perform? / How do you ensure data security?  What security behaviors do you not perform? / What do you find difficult to do? 
For behaviors discussed by participants, the following elicitation questions were used 
Determinant Example elicitation questions 
Self-efficacy If you want to perform these behaviors, how certain are you that you can? 
Experiential Attitude What do you like/dislike about these behaviors? 
Instrumental Attitude What are the advantages and disadvantages of performing these behaviors? 
Social pressures Who would encourage/ discourage you to perform these behaviors? 
Response efficacy How effective do you think these behaviors are in reducing threats and why? 
Response cost What are the costs in terms of monetary, time and effort in performing these behaviors? 
Perceived susceptibility How vulnerable to a threat are you by not performing these behaviors? 
Perceived severity What are the potential consequences of not performing these behaviors? 
 
Closing questions  Anything else that you feel you contribute to security that hasn’t been discussed?  What are the top three security behaviors you think are most important? 
 
<Participant provided with debrief sheet and thanked for their participation> 
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7.3 Appendix C: Initial and Final framework 
 
7.3.1 Initial framework based on literature  
 
 
 
 
7.3.1.1 Final data-driven framework from framework analysis 
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7.4 Appendix D: Theme Visualizations 
7.4.1 Response Evaluation 
 
 
 
7.4.2 Threat Evaluation 
 
 
7.4.3 Experience 
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7.4.4 Knowledge 
 
 
7.4.5 Personal and Work Boundaries 
 
 
 
7.4.6 Responsibility 
 
 
7.4.7 Security behavior 
 
